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Unrevised Section 2-207--Different Terms Revisited 
 
 




Courts and commentators agree that unrevised U.C.C. § 2-207, the “battle of the forms” 
provision, suffers from a lack of clarity. [FN1] However, that should not be a license to add to 
the murky waters, more particularly to adopt a rule--the knockout rule--that lacks support in the 
statutory scheme. Let us consider a hypothetical. B sends S a written offer to purchase 10 
computers, Model No. 2100, at a cost of $5,000 for a computer. The offer states: “you warrant 
that your Model No. 2100 computers have the same features and capabilities as your competitor's 
Model AB700.” The warranty is critical because the Model 2100 was worth only $2,000 to B 
without the warranty. S sends a seasonable written acknowledgement that contains a definite 
expression of acceptance but adds: “S makes no express warranty and disclaims and excludes 
any express warranty.” Given these facts, has a contract been formed, and what are its terms? It 
is a classic battle of the forms dispute. More specifically, has a contract been formed on the 
terms offered or does the different express warranty term in S's acceptance knock out the express 
warranty in B's offer? For an answer, we first turn to unrevised section 2-207, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is 
sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms 
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is 
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. 
 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. 
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: 
 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
 
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a 
reasonable time after notice of them is received. 
 
Courts are basically in agreement that under section 2-207 if S's response constitutes a 
definite expression of acceptance a contract is formed under subsection (1) even though S's 
response states express warranty terms different from the express warranty terms in B's offer. 
[FN2] Courts part company, however, on the treatment of the different term in S's acceptance. 
As can be seen, subsection (1) refers to additional or different terms while subsection (2) only 
expressly covers additional terms. Courts have formulated three approaches to different terms. 
[FN3] One approach treats different terms the same as additional terms and therefore applies 
subsection (2) to different terms. Another approach disregards different terms contained in the 
acceptance since different terms are not mentioned in subsection (2) and thus are not construed 
as proposals that can become part of the contract. The third approach applies the “knockout” rule 
under which the conflicting terms on S and B's forms would knock each other out and would not 
be part of the contract. 
The knockout rule seems to be premised on the assumption that the offeree's acceptance 
is treated as an acceptance only of the terms on which the documents in our hypothetical, B's 
offer and S's acknowledgement, agree. [FN4] This would mean that in our hypothetical the 
contract terms would not include the express warranty in B's offer. 
However, on close analysis, it appears that section 2-207 and general contract principles 
should preclude adoption of the so-called knockout rule and that Comment 6, [FN5] relied on by 
some courts, [FN6] does not support such a rule. 
The starting point for any analysis must be the language of the statute itself. Subsection 
(1) of 2-207 clearly provides that “a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance... operates 
as an acceptance” even though it states different terms from those “offered or agreed upon.” The 
UCC does not define the word “acceptance.” Turning to contract law, [FN7] we know that an 
“acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a 
manner invited or required by the offer.” [FN8] Simply put, the offeree's definite expression of 
acceptance is nothing more than an expression of assent to the terms offered--and not to the 
terms of the offer minus the different terms. Nothing in contract law permits an offeree to 
selectively accept terms of the offer, and nothing in section 2-207 or the comments indicates that 
the UCC was so radically departing from the effect of an acceptance, namely that it constitutes 
an assent to the terms offered. 
To be sure, subsection (1) changes the common-law contracts mirror image rule. [FN9] 
In contrast to the mirror image rule, subsection (1) provides that a definite expression of 
acceptance that states additional or different terms from those offered is nevertheless an 
acceptance unless the offeree expressly conditions his acceptance on the offeror's assent to the 
different or additional terms. Thus subsection (l) gives an offeree two choices. The offeree can 
choose (i) to accept the terms offered or (ii) if the offeree does not want to assent to the terms 
offered unless additional or different terms contained in his acceptance become part of the 
contract, he can choose to expressly make his acceptance conditional on the offeree's assent to 
the additional or different terms. Subsection (1) does not give the offeree a third choice--to 
accept the terms of the offer with which the offeree agrees and to simultaneously reject the terms 
in that offer with which he differs. There appears to be no room to argue that an acceptance 
under subsection (1) is only an acceptance of the terms on which the offer and acceptance agree. 
Thus, once the offeree sends an unconditional acceptance, he has chosen to form a contract that 
contains at the very least all the terms offered. Put differently, neither section 2-207 nor the 
comments suggest that the UCC was in any way rejecting the contract law concept that the 
offeror is the master of the offer [FN10] and espousing a view that the offeror may be forced into 
a contract on terms different from those offered. [FN11] Thus the plain language of subsection 
(1) and contract law concepts would seem to bar the knockout rule. 
In sum, courts adopting the knockout rule in effect are adopting a rule that flies in the 
face of a basic contract concept--that the offeror is the master of the offer--and the express 
language of subsection (1). Certainly if such a drastic departure from contract law principles 
were intended, it would have been clearly expressed in the statute or stated in a comment. 
Section 2-207 was designed to change only the mirror image rule--not the concept that 
acceptance of an offer forms a contract that contains at least the terms offered. 
For these reasons Comment 6 cannot be reasonably read as supporting a general 
knockout rule. Further, the result under Comment 6--that conflicting terms on confirming forms 
do not become part of the contract--stems from an application of section 2-207(2)(c) to those 
terms and not because of a knockout rule. Assuming that a buyer's confirmation form states a 
term different from those orally agreed upon, but the seller's does not, the different term on the 
buyer's confirmation would fall by the wayside. This is so because there is no basis in section 2-
207 or general contract law principles for the different term in the buyer's confirmation to have 
any effect on the oral terms the parties previously agreed upon. [FN12] Now take the case where 
neither the buyer nor the seller's confirmation has any term that differs from the terms the parties 
previously orally agreed upon but where B's confirmation has a term that conflicts with a term on 
S's confirmation. Each of the conflicting terms on the confirmations would be an additional term 
in relation to the parties' oral agreement. Such additional terms would be run through section 2-
207(2) and, as Comment 6 states: 
Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict each party must be 
assumed to object to a clause of the other conflicting with one on the confirmation sent by 
himself. As a result the requirement that there be notice of objection which is found in subsection 
(2) is satisfied and the conflicting terms do not become part of the contract.  
What seems clear is that conflicting terms on the buyer's and seller's confirmations do not 
become part of the contract because of the application of section 2-207(2)(c) and not because 
Comment 6 creates and applies a so-called knockout rule. For this reason, Comment 6 speaks of 
the parties satisfying section 2-207(2)(c)'s notice of objection requirement rather than simply 
saying that the terms knock each other out or cancel each other. 
Supporters of the knockout rule say that if this rule is not adopted, then the sender of the 
first form will have an unearned advantage. [FN13] To the extent that the sender of the first form 
is given an advantage that advantage stems from section 2-207's rejection of the mirror image 
rule and the last shot doctrine. This advantage can be seen from section 2-207's treatment of 
additional terms. An offeree's definite expression of acceptance that contains additional terms 
nevertheless constitutes an acceptance--not a rejection as under common law--and under 
subsection (1) a contract is formed on the offeror's terms. The offeree's additional terms, even if 
material, are treated under subsection (2) only as proposals for addition to the contract that was 
already formed by the offeree's acceptance. Further, under 2-207, such additional terms cannot 
become part of the contract against the offeror's will. First, material additional terms 
automatically fall by the wayside unless of course the offeror expressly agrees to them. [FN14] 
And nonmaterial additional terms can only become part of the contract if the parties are 
merchants and the offeror does not object to them in a reasonable time. [FN15] As the first 
sentence of Comment 6 explains, “if no answer is received within a reasonable time after 
additional terms are proposed, it is both fair and commercially sound to assume that their 
inclusion has been assented to.” Thus, under 2-207, as Professor Farnsworth aptly notes, “the 
advantage has shifted from the party that fires the last shot [FN16] to the one that makes the first 
offer.” [FN17] This advantage is a bit greater if the transaction is between consumers or between 
a consumer and a merchant. [FN18] In such a case, the additional terms, whether material or not, 
do not become part of the contract unless the offeror assents to them. In short, the UCC confers 
an advantage on the offeror when dealing with additional terms and there appears to be no 
indication that it did not intend to confer at least the same advantage when dealing with different 
terms in the offeree's acceptance. 
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[FN5]. Comment 6 reads as follows:  
If no answer is received within a reasonable time after additional terms are proposed, it is both 
fair and commercially sound to assume that their inclusion has been assented to. Where clauses 
on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict each party must be assumed to object to a 
clause of the other conflicting with one on the confirmation sent by himself. As a result the 
requirement that there be notice of objection which is found in subsection (2) is satisfied and the 
conflicting terms do not become a part of the contract. The contract then consists of the terms 
originally expressly agreed to, terms on which the confirmations agree, and terms supplied by 
this Act, including subsection (2). The written confirmation is also subject to Section 2-201. 
Under that section a failure to respond permits enforcement of a prior oral argument; under this 
section a failure to respond permits additional terms to become part of the agreement. [Comment 
6 was amended in 1966]. 
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[FN12]. See American Parts Co., Inc. (Detroit Body Products Co. Division) v. American 
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[FN14]. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b). 
 
[FN15]. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2). 
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of the forms”). 
 
[FN17]. Farnsworth, Contracts § 3.21 (4th ed. 2004). 
 
[FN18]. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) applies only “between merchants.” 
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